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INTRODUCTION
In the corporate law imagination, no case symbolizes the end of
managerialism and the triumph of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm better than Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.1
Decided in the midst of the hostile takeover decade of the 1980s, the case
has given rise to Revlon duties, namely the idea that when a “company was
for sale . . . directors . . . [were] charged with getting the best price for the
*
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1. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1986).
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stockholders. . . .”2 By 1994, “a sale” was interpreted to include a change in
control,3 and by 2009, with the development of the standard of good faith,
the directors’ charge became not to “utterly fail[] to attempt to obtain the best
price.”4 Still, Revlon remains fundamental. As Leo E. Strine Jr., former
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, writes, “in the discussion of
what directors must focus on as their central goal, within the limits of their
legal discretion, Revlon is central, and clearly states a board can only
consider the interests of other constituencies if ‘rationally related benefits
accru[e] to the stockholders.’”5
Justice G.T. Moore who wrote the decision in Revlon did not reference
a precedent to support the idea that shareholder wealth maximization should
guide directors seeking to sell their company.6 More broadly, the origins of
the shareholder wealth maximization ideal remain unexplored. As Karen Ho
writes in her ethnography of Wall Street, “despite its ubiquity and dominance
in American capitalism, ‘shareholder value’ continues to be a black box, an
uninterrogated concept that desperately needs to be contextualized within
particular power relationships, institutional configurations, and a specific
interpretation of financial history.”7
This Article begins to unpack the history of corporate law’s presumed
commitment to shareholder value, offering a new framework by which to
assess corporate law’s devotion to shareholder wealth maximization. Using
three cases, each marking a different stage in the history of corporate law
and theory—the early-twentieth-century Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (out of
Michigan), the midcentury Bayer v. Beran (out of New York), and the latecentury Revlon (out of Delaware)—this Article examines how the
shareholder wealth maximization idea emerged and developed and its
bearing on the law of corporate purpose. Specifically, this Article explores
how, in each period, distinct concerns for minority shareholders led courts
to use the language of profit maximization not to impose affirmative duties

2. Id. at 182.
3. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
4. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009).
5. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Cleareyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation
Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 767 fn. 20 (2015).
6. See also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) (holding, without
precedent, that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del. Ch.
2010) (failing to include precedent for the conclusion that “directors of a for-profit Delaware
corporation cannot deploy a [policy] to defend a business strategy that openly eschews
stockholder wealth maximization.”).
7. KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 123 (2009).
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on directors and executives nor to define a single corporate purpose, but
simply to assure minority shareholders that corporations were run for their
benefit so as to promote equity investment and the continued success of the
securities markets.
The first part, 1900s-1930s: The Progressive Origins of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization, explores the shareholder primacy idea in the early
twentieth century. Placing Dodge and the famous debate between Adolf A.
Berle and E. Merrick Dodd about directors’ duties and corporate social
responsibilities in their historical context, I argue that Progressive jurists
viewed the requirement that corporations maximize shareholder wealth as a
means of sanctioning the power of those in control (typically controlling
shareholders who also served as corporate directors and executives) while
protecting minority shareholders against potential abuse of power by the
control group.
The second part, 1940s-1950s: The Individual Minority Shareholder in
Court, probes Bayer to demonstrate how, in the midcentury years,
discussions about shareholder wealth maximization were buried within the
analysis of directors’ duties, especially their duty of loyalty. I argue that in
the 1940s, the New York courts, for example, sought to balance boosting
entrepreneurial freedom with assurances to individual shareholders, who
were typically invested for steady income and who had little control over the
affairs of their companies, that their investments would yield profit. As the
courts moved away from strict prohibition of conflict-of-interest transactions
to the more relaxed standard of fairness, and thus were more likely to affirm
managerial power and discretion, judges also attempted to assure plaintiffs
that, in fact, their corporations were profitable. By making wealth
maximization, if only in dicta, an aspect of the discussion of fiduciary
obligations, by bringing together profitability and loyalty, these midcentury
cases planted the seeds for the late-twentieth-century discourse of
shareholder profit maximization.
The third part, 1960s-1980s: Fairness and Profit in the Age of Finance,
focuses on Delaware courts in the second half of the twentieth century. It
examines how in the 1960s, as these courts embraced the idea that managers
should have broad discretion, shielded from liability by the presumption of
the business judgment rule, they gradually made efficiency the only matrix
by which directors’ actions could be evaluated. By the 1980s, as President
Reagan’s deregulation policies helped unleash a wave of hostile takeovers,
the Supreme Court of Delaware brought this matrix to bear upon its analysis
of fiduciary duties when directors engaged in friendly mergers or responded
to hostile tender offers. Just as large corporations and well-to-do financiers
replaced the minority, individual shareholder as the typical plaintiff in
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corporate litigation, the Delaware courts made share price an element of the
fairness standard for assessing directors’ decisions. Like similar assertions
throughout the twentieth century, Revlon’s charge that directors must get
“the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company” was thus a
statement about the standard of review applicable in cases involving
allegations of a breach of the duty of loyalty, not about corporate purpose.
In 1992, legal historian Morton Horwitz noted that “an important task
of legal theory . . . is to uncover the specific historical possibilities of legal
conceptions—to ‘decode’ their true concrete meanings in real historical
situations.”8 Three decades later, the rules governing the relationship
between directors, officers, and shareholders continue to be discussed in
abstract. Little, if any, attention is given in corporate law scholarship to the
social, cultural, or political circumstances that influenced courts’ decisions.
By exploring the shareholder wealth maximization idea in the contexts in
which it developed throughout the past century, this Article demonstrates
that the norm is nothing more than rhetoric, developed not to ensure that
shareholders profit, but rather to assuage minority shareholders’ concerns
while, in fact, sustaining the absolute discretion of corporate managers. In
so doing, I hope this Article sheds light not only on our understanding of
corporate law’s commitment to shareholder value, but also on the
significance of context to the study of corporate law.
I. 1900-1930S: THE PROGRESSIVE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION
Proponents of the proposition that corporate directors must maximize
value for the corporation’s shareholders often trace the idea back to two
early-twentieth-century sources: the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919
decision in Dodge v. Ford and Adolf A. Berle’s statements in his early-1930s
scholarly debate with E. Merrick Dodd. As I elaborate below, neither Dodge
nor Berle embraced the idea that shareholder wealth maximization was
corporate law’s purpose. Rather, both reflected the early-twentieth-century
favor for protecting minority shareholders against abuse of power by those
in control.9

8. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 106–07 (1992).
9. On corporate purpose in the early twentieth century, see generally Dalia T. Mitchell,
From Dodge to eBay: The Elusive Corporate Purpose, 13 VA. L. BUS. REV. 155, 163–180
(2019).
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A. “One of the most famous corporate cases of all time”10
The saga of Dodge v. Ford began in 1903, when John and Horace
Dodge, then owners of an auto-parts making business, entered an exclusive
agreement with Henry Ford to supply parts to the new Ford Motor Company.
Ford, who had suffered successive business failures, could not pay for the
initial parts, and instead offered the Dodge brothers fifty shares each of the
Ford Motor Company’s one thousand authorized and issued common stock
in exchange for their notes of $5,000 each.11 Under Ford’s control, the Ford
Motor Company was extremely successful and the Dodge brothers, as
shareholders, received large amounts of special dividends.12 But in 1916,
Ford had decided to stop paying special dividends, announcing that he
intended to put the profits back into the company, hire more employees, and
further reduce the price of Ford cars.13 The Dodge brothers, who by 1913
stopped making parts for the Ford Motor Company and began manufacturing
their cars, sued, claiming that Ford’s actions turned the company into a semieleemosynary institution in violation of its charter.14 Chief Justice Ostrander
held for them, stating:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes.15
Since then, many have turned to Dodge v. Ford to justify the
proposition that corporations’ sole responsibility is to maximize profit to
their shareholders (often ignoring the qualifier “primarily” in the quote

10. Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable
Giving Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 833 (2009).
11. M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old is
New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 47–48 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
12. Miller, supra note 10, at 833.
13. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 465, 490, 505 (1919) (“‘My ambition,’
said Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we
are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business.’”).
14. Id. at 504; see also Miller, supra note 10, at 835 (discussing the lawsuit and critiquing
the court’s claim that Ford’s actions were charitable).
15. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507 (emphasis added).
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above).16 Others have suggested that the decision did not aim to determine
a purpose for corporations but rather to protect minority shareholders from
the power of those in control.17 Notably, a careful reading of the case reveals
that the legal doctrine according to which the case was decided is rather
vague. Placing Dodge in its historical context indeed suggests a more
tentative reading of Ostrander’s statement. As I elaborate below, Dodge was
a transitional case, situated between the nineteenth-century approach to
protecting minority shareholders in closely held corporations and the early
twentieth-century’s emerging concerns about the power that corporations,
especially the growing publicly held corporations, and their control group
held over individual investors and the economy at large.
Minority shareholders have historically been in a precarious situation.
As Naomi Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal documented, those in
control “negotiated contracts with other companies in which they had a
financial interest, elected themselves to corporate offices at lucrative salaries
that they themselves set, arranged mergers that earned themselves impressive
capital gains while leaving other shareholders in the lurch, and engaged in a
wide variety of other actions” benefiting themselves at the expense of other
corporate constituencies.18 And minority shareholders had few if any
effective tools to protect their interests against the control group’s abuse of
power. Voluntary dissolution was not available and, typically, minority
shareholders did not own enough stock to elect a new slate of directors. If
the company was publicly traded, shareholders might have been able to sell
their shares but generally “at a price discounted to reflect the majority’s
behavior.”19 If the company was closely held, as it often had been, “the only
buyers for their shares were the same majority shareholders with whom they
were in conflict.”20 As Lamoreaux and Rosenthal conclude, controlling

16. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993)
(arguing that Dodge v. Ford supports the idea that shareholder profit maximization is
corporate law’s “fundamental norm.”).
17. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 164, 166–168 (2008) and citations there (arguing that the decision in Dodge v. Ford
intended to protect minority shareholders from oppressive actions by those in control, not to
articulate a purpose for corporations).
18. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Convergence and the
Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression 3–4 (2004),
available at www.nber.org/papers/w10900 [https://perma.cc/5WFX-JCUC].
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
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shareholders were “effectively dictators.”21
In 1832, the New York court held that “stockholders might, after
demonstrating that the corporation was controlled by those who were
abusing their trust, file a bill in their own names, ‘making the corporation a
party defendant.’”22 In so empowering minority shareholders “to sue on
behalf of the corporation when the corporation will not or is unable to do
so,” the court “recognized that noncontrolling shareholders needed a legal
recourse when defrauded or otherwise treated inequitably by those who did
control the corporation.”23 Courts in other states followed suit, and in 1855,
so did the U.S. Supreme Court.24 Still, because at the time, most corporations
were closely held and controlled, with a few, if any, public shareholders, the
derivative action was rarely used.25
Trust law offered “justification[s] for the intervention of equity to
prevent fraud,” and courts stressed that where directors or controlling
shareholders “acting in bad faith, carry into effect a scheme which, even if
lawful upon its face, is intended to circumvent the minority stockholders and
defraud them out of their legal rights,” courts would “remedy the wrong.”26
But courts were restrained in determining “what constituted an abuse of trust
by those in control.”27 Seeking to encourage the growth of corporations, they
21. Id. at 14. Commonly, the power struggle at the time was between minority and
controlling shareholders, and “this struggle, furthermore, took place in corporations that had
far fewer shareholders than the publicly traded leviathans of the twentieth century.” Harwell
Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the TwentyFirst Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2015).
22. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 22. See also Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige
222 (1832) (holding that the corporation was a necessary party in a lawsuit brought by its
stockholders against its directors).
23. Wells, supra note 21, at 1048.
24. Jessica Erickson, The Lost Lessons of Shareholder Derivative Suits, 77 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2020); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855). See also John Matheson,
Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 344 (2016)
(“This recognition of the derivative suit solidified the concept of holding directors and officers
of corporations accountable for their actions”); George D. Hornstein, Problems of Procedure
in Stockholder’s Derivative Suit, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 574 (1942) (“For more than a
hundred years it has been established that . . . [w]here a corporation has been injured and
should sue, but refuses or neglects to do so, a stockholder may maintain a suit in equity on its
behalf.”).
25. JOHN C. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL AND FUTURE 33
(2015).
26. Chester Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as Means of Corporate
Control, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 692, 695 (1933) (quoting the New York Court of Appeals in Flynn
v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., I58 N. Y. 493, 507–8 (1899)).
27. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 23. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal note that,
at least in part, the courts’ reluctance to intervene was their concern that by protecting minority
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were reluctant to intervene in a corporation’s affairs (and the affairs of those
in control) to protect the interests of minority shareholders unless the latter
could demonstrate “gross fraud or abuse of trust” harmful to the corporation
or the shareholders.28 As the United States Supreme Court declared in Hawes
v. Oakland, to sustain litigation “in a court of equity in his own name,” a
minority shareholder would have to show
a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the
acting managers, in connection with some other party, or among
themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in serious
injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other
shareholders; Or where the board of directors, or a majority of
them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of
the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders; Or
where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively
and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation,
which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders . . . .29
Most significantly, “shareholders could not sue officers and directors of
corporations simply because they pursued policies that the former thought
were wrongheaded or disadvantageous. Such disagreements were matters of
business judgment and, as such, beyond the purview of the courts.”30
Why, then, didn’t the Supreme Court of Michigan view the conflict
between the Dodge brothers and Ford merely as a disagreement about
business judgment? Fortunately for John and Horace Dodge, in the
nineteenth century, “corporations were expected to pay profits out in regular
dividends unless prevented by financial difficulty.”31 And courts were more
likely to intervene when the control group stopped payments of dividends
while continuing to pay itself salaries, a practice known as freezing-out
minority shareholders.32 Ford stopped paying special dividends so that he
shareholders, they might “undermin[e] the legal differences between corporations and
partnerships” by “creating a situation in which disagreements among members of the firm
could disrupt the functioning of corporations as easily as they did partnerships.” Id. According
to Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “for this reason, the courts were very conservative in defining
what constituted an abuse of trust by those in control.” Id.
28. Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Private Rights of Organizations: The
Tangled Roots of the Family, the Corporation, and the Right to Privacy 52 (2007), available
at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Lamoreaux/Lamoreaux468.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K9XD-TJQ8].
29. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881). See also Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra
note 28, at 44–52 (exploring the treatment of minority shareholders in nineteenth century
corporate law).
30. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 23.
31. Wells, supra note 21, at 1046.
32. Rohrlich, supra note 26, at 701.
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could, presumably, reduce the price of his cars, but his actions resembled a
typical freeze-out. Ostrander’s opinion could thus be seen as extending to
the Dodge brothers the common protection against the control group’s abuse
of their dividend power.33
Moreover, as the following section I.B elaborates, by the time Dodge
was decided, changes to the structure of corporations and investment that
took place in the early twentieth century helped change jurists’ attitudes
toward minority shareholders and likely swayed the Michigan court’s
opinion, making Dodge a precursor for modern corporate law.
B. The Modern Corporation’s Minority Shareholders
The reluctance of nineteenth-century courts to protect minority
shareholders’ interests reflected not only a commitment to the promotion of
business and their managers, but also cultural attitudes toward investment in
securities. For a large part of American history, ownership of private
property has been considered the foundation of the republic.34 Responsible
citizenship was associated with ownership of productive property, not idle
money. Even after the growth of corporations and the gradual abolition of
property requirements for suffrage began to transform the cultural and legal
understanding of proprietorship and citizenship, financial speculation
remained an anathema to republican values.35
The tide began to shift at the turn of the twentieth century. The
financing of the railroads introduced public security financing of industry
and helped change public opinion.36 Beginning in the merger wave of the
1880s, rapid industrial and business growth increased the demand for
capital.37 Seeking to maximize their own profits, entrepreneurs found ways
to convince the American public to invest in their enterprises, first in railroad
bonds and industrial preferred stock, and then, by the second decade of

33. Id.; see also Note: Minority Shareholders Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends,
64 HARV. L. REV. 299 (1950).
34. L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental Property,
82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 618 (1988).
35. JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN
INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 12–14 (2011).
36. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of
Representatives on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 (bills to suspend the authority of
the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 14(a) and section 14(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act to issue rules relating to the solicitation of proxies, consents, and
authorizations during the period of war emergency), 78th Cong. (June 9-11, 1943).
37. Id. at 3–4.
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twentieth century, in common stock.38 After the Liberty Bonds drives of
World War I, investment in securities became associated with modern
citizenship and the American democratic ideal.39 Low-wage employees,
women, and recent immigrants were all welcomed into and included within
a new nation of investors.40
At the same time, changes to state corporation laws have helped erode
investors’ ability to affect their corporations’ affairs. These changes
included the erosion of the ultra vires doctrine,41 the reintroduction of the
idea that the board’s power was “original and undelegated,”42 and the
elimination of the shareholders’ right to remove directors at will, all of which
helped minimize shareholder control.43 So too did changing voting rules.
Proxy voting became the norm and states gradually adopted statutes allowing
a simple majority of the shareholders to approve the sale of corporate assets,
abolishing the nineteenth-century rule of unanimity.44 The newly legalized
holding company further undermined shareholders’ power, allowing one
corporation to control the majority of stock of many direct and indirect
subsidiaries through pyramiding.45 Limitations on the voting rights of
certain classes of shareholders, including non-voting stock and conditional
voting stock, also became common in the first decades of our century.46
Indeed, despite growing number of equity investors, and perhaps due to
38. OTT, supra note 35, at 132.
39. Id. at 54–56; see also Janette Rutterford & Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, The Rise of the
Small Investor in the US and the UK, 1895 to 1970, 18 ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY 485, 490
(2017) (“In the United States, early common stock investors were primarily bankers and
industrialists. It was not until after the merger boom of 1897 to 1904 that common stocks, and
in particular preference shares were issued to fund the large corporations being formed and
began to be held by a broader spectrum of investors, albeit a relatively small number in
total.”).
40. HO, supra note 7, at 180–81; Rutterford and Sotiropoulos, supra note 39, at 92–93.
But see Sarah C. Haan, Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3740608 [https://perma.cc/Q94A-77S
5] (exploring the role of women investors in the early twentieth century and the discriminatory
attitudes they faced).
41. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 77–78.
42. Id. at 99 (quoting Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918)).
43. Id. at 88–89.
44. Id. (discussing the erosion of the unanimity rule in the early twentieth century); see
also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L. J. 871, 907–09 (2004) (noting how changes to corporate voting rules
during the nineteenth century weakened shareholder control).
45. Winkler, supra note 44, at 907–08; W.H.S. Stevens, Shareholders’ Voting Rights and
the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 354–55 (1926).
46. Stevens, supra note 45, at 362–67. See also Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as
Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1522–27
(2006) (describing these different changes).
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concerns about the influx of new investors,47 the control of productive
property remained concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy entrepreneurs
and their investment bankers,48 raising grave concerns among Progressive
scholars about the potential for abuse of power by those in control and about
the plight of the individual shareholder.49 In 1904, Thorstein Veblen noted
that “under corporate organization the owners of the industrial material have
no voice in its management.”50 In 1911, an article titled Evils of Corporate
Control declared that “[t]he facility with which capital passes under the
control of strong groups of individuals creates one of the most serious
problems of modern times.”51 In 1913, the report of the Pujo (Banking and
Currency) Committee announced the existence of a money trust, consisting
of a small number of financiers sitting on multiple corporate boards.
According to the report, these financiers controlled the economy with the
assistance of the New York Stock Exchange, which allowed practices such
as pooling and other stock price manipulation techniques to the detriment of
working- and middle-class individual investors.52 And in 1914, shortly
before he was appointed to the United States Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis
explained that investment bankers became “[t]he dominant element in our
financial oligarchy.”53
They became promoters and directors of
corporations, and were able, through their economic power, to control even
those boards on which they did not sit.54 By controlling other people’s
money, Brandeis wrote, investment bankers and their associates could
“control the people through the people’s own money.”55
Calls for state and federal legislation to protect minority investors also
mounted, becoming more vocal by the end of the First World War as
corporations were trying to lure “citizen-investors holding excess cash from
47. See, e.g., Haan, supra note 40, at 14–19 (discussing the expansion of stockholding
and the bull market in the 1920s).
48. See, e.g., Miguel Cantillo Simon, The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United
States: 1890–1939, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1077, 1081 (1998) (“By 1912, 18 financial institutions
sat on the boards of 134 corporations with $25.325 billion in combined assets. Of these 18
institutions, 5 banks . . . sat on the boards of 68 nonfinancial corporations with $17.273 billion
in assets . . . U.S. GNP in 1912 was $39.4 billion.”).
49. Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1528–35.
50. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 146 (1904).
51. William E. Harmon, Evils of Corporate Control, 2 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y.C. 48
(1911).
52. OTT, supra note 35, at 32–33.
53. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 4
(1914).
54. See id. at 1–27 (describing the confluence of factors supporting the concentration of
power in investment bankers).
55. Id. at 17–18.
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Liberty bond, War Savings, or Government Savings redemptions and interest
payments.”56 And courts supplemented calls for state and federal legislation
by beginning to hold those in control of business enterprises to stricter
obligations toward minority shareholders.57 In 1914, Brandeis, concerned
about the small investor, noted that:
The small investors, particularly the women, who are holding an
ever-increasing proportion of our corporate securities, commonly
buy on the recommendation of their bankers. The small investors
do not, and in most cases cannot, ascertain for themselves the facts
on which to base a proper judgment as to the soundness of
securities offered. And even if these investors were furnished with
the facts, they lack the business experience essential to forming a
proper judgment.58
Not surprisingly, in 1919, Justice Brandeis held that:
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled
and has been often applied. The majority has the right to control;
but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the
minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and
directors. If through that control a sale of the corporate property is
made and the property acquired by the majority, the minority may
not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale.59
Dodge, also decided in 1919, reflected a similar sentiment. “There
should be no confusion (of which there is evidence),” Ostrander stressed, “of
the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe to
protesting, minority stockholders.”60 The duty to maximize profit to the
shareholders applied only in the latter context.61
Notably, Horace and John Dodge, successful businessmen, were unlike
56. OTT, supra note 35, at 127.
57. See Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 33
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (2011) (describing the stricter obligations toward minority
shareholders).
58. BRANDEIS, supra note 53, at 199–200.
59. S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919).
60. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507.
61. Id. Indeed, Ostrander was quick to emphasize, that

Id.

there is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to be exercised in
good faith, the infinite details of business, including the wages which shall be
paid to employees, the number of hours they shall work, the conditions under
which labor shall be carried on, and the price for which products shall be offered
to the public.
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the individual shareholder on which Progressives’ attention focused. For the
typical minority shareholder, ownership of productive property was often
improbable. Instead, employees found an investment in their employer’s
business a way to capture the profits to which they contributed, while
women, who, after the Civil War, were gradually allowed to control their
own property but continued to have limited employment opportunities, have
found investment in stock a means of receiving regular income and
supporting their families.62
Still, at a time when corporations were seeking to convince investors,
typically of middle-class background, to invest in their corporate stock while
simultaneously lobbying for legal changes that minimized these investors’
control, the Michigan court’s statement in Dodge that “a business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders”63 was significant. Just as Michigan (like other midwestern
states) was witnessing the rapid “rise of factory and decline of farm,”64
Ostrander opted to encourage investment in factories by assuring minority
shareholders that state courts would protect them from abuse of power by the
control group. To do so, Ostrander, perhaps inadvertently, also turned the
traditional limitation on the accountability of those in control (their fraud or
abuse of trust had to have been detrimental to the corporation and its
shareholders) into an affirmative duty to maximize profits. As the following
section I.C explores, in the decade that followed Dodge, Progressive
scholars, most notably Adolf A. Berle, Jr., brought a similar outlook to bear
upon the fate of the more common, minority shareholder.
C. “[T]he privilege of taking the golden eggs laid by somebody else’s
goose”65
The decade that followed Dodge witnessed an “unprecedented influx of
new investors into the stock market.”66 In the early part of the 1920s,
corporations marketed their shares directly, especially to their employees and
customers, “in the hopes of repelling unionization and federal intrusions into
labor relations” as well as deflecting antitrust suits.67 By the second part of
the 1920s, financial firms began to encourage investment in stock “as a
62.
63.
64.
(1997).
65.
66.
67.

OTT, supra note 35, at 185–86.
Dodge, 204 Mich. at 505.
Craig R. Olson, Michigan in the Twentieth Century, 84 J. OF AM. HIST. 181, 182
BRANDEIS, supra note 53, at 18.
OTT, supra note 35, at 169.
Id. at 152.

2022]

SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

713

mechanism for subjecting corporate capitalism to democratic discipline.”68
The growing numbers of individual investors exacerbated the need to
protect minority shareholders from the power of control. As one editorial
put it, “[m]any managements, swollen with power, came to believe that their
enterprises had ceased to be reservoirs of trust funds for stockholders and
creditors but had become agencies for their own private immediate gain.”69
Huge salaries and bonuses, management’s participation in its own
underwriting, using corporate funds to manipulate the market, and other
forms of self-dealing became common.70 Rather than being an “economic
savior,” management turned out to be “often without vision, incapable of
self-regulation, unmindful of duties to investors, and almost unaware of its
responsibilities to society as a whole.”71
Adolf Berle, a Columbia Law School professor who would become a
member of Franklin Roosevelt’s brain trust, shared the sentiment.72 In 1925,
he cautioned that “power without responsibility is, philosophically, a
perilous matter.”73 As he elaborated, because management stock would
likely be controlled by the investment banking house that served as a
promoter for the corporation, “it [was] possible, if not probable, that there
[would] be attractive opportunities for manipulation of securities, for
negotiating favorable contracts with allied interests, or even for giving value
to stock which represent[ed] no real investment.”74 Given the “web of
economic interests” which the investment banking house served and from
which it made its profits, it was likely that management stock would be voted
for transactions that benefited the investment banking house, or even the
controlling groups, but not the controlled corporation.75
For Berle, imposing strict fiduciary obligations on the control group
was a means of protecting the new, individual minority shareholders. As he
wrote, “with neither power nor information, the stockholder becomes merely
the beneficiary—cestui—of the corporate management . . . Deprive him of
any right by way of fiduciary relation, and the business becomes too

68. Id. at 169; see also JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN AND PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY
189–97 (1997).
69. Business Versus the Public, 8 ACCT. REV. 162, 163 (1933).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. On Berle’s career, see generally JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE
AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA (1987).
73. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV.
673, 674 (1925–26).
74. Id. at 676.
75. Id.
OF CORPORATE FINANCE
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hazardous to continue.”76 Wishing himself to be the “Marx of the
shareholder class,”77 Berle’s work throughout the 1920s emphasized the need
to protect minority investors from fraud and manipulative practices that, at
the time, plagued the securities markets; he wanted to rein in the power of
the control group. This work culminated in his 1931 article, titled Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust.78
Published shortly after the 1929 market crash, Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust focused on the power to issue stock, the power to declare
dividends, the power to amend the charter, and the power to engage in
fundamental transactions. Berle declared that these corporate powers were
held in trust for the benefit of shareholders.79 While the courts had
previously considered these and similar managerial powers a matter of
contract law (perhaps because corporations were closely held) and thus
susceptible to statutory changes and the possibility of opting out, Berle
wanted to make these powers (especially in the context of publicly held
corporations) a matter of the control group’s trusteeship duties.80
Many have since suggested that Berle’s argument offered an early
articulation of the shareholder wealth maximization ideal. For the most part,
these assessments draw on the only response the article elicited, E. Merrick
Dodd’s.81 Dodd’s vision of corporate management was one of public service.
He wanted to validate corporate social policies that benefited different
constituencies, including employees, consumers, investors, and the
community at large, even when such policies resulted in diminution of profits
for the shareholders. Announcing that he was “thoroughly in sympathy with
Mr. Berle’s efforts to establish a legal control which [would] more
effectually prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their own
pockets from those of stockholders,” Dodd stated that the corporation
nonetheless had “social service as well as a profit-making function.”82
Dodd’s characterization failed to recognize, however, that Berle was
focused on protecting minority shareholders from the power of control, not
on finding a purpose for the corporation. Not surprisingly, Berle, who did
76. Adolf A. Berle, Publicity of Accounts, Management Purchase of Stock and Control
of Security Value, in STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS FINANCE 180 (1928).
77. SCHWARZ, supra note 72, at 62; see also NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971: FROM
THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 26 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973).
78. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1050–72.
81. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
82. Id. at 1147–48.
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not anticipate the rebuttal, responded promptly and swiftly. Lawyers, Berle
wrote, “know what the social theorist does not,” namely that “when the
fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and ‘control’ to
stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and ‘control’
become for all practical purposes absolute.”83 Accordingly, one could not
“abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business corporations exist for the sole
purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time as [one is]
prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else.”84 Managers could be trusted to run
corporations, but clear guidelines had to be set as to how they would perform
their duties.
Within a year of its publication, Berle’s Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust was reprinted as chapter VII in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, a book Berle co-authored with Gardiner C. Means.85 Careful to
distinguish the duties of the control group from the broader question of
corporate social responsibilities, Berle and Means stressed that “it is the
purpose of this chapter to state this theory, with full realization of the
possibility that private property may one day cease to be the basic concept
in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale enterprise and
that the corporate mechanism may prove the very means through which such
modification is brought about.”86
Offering an example of a potential modification to the system of private
property, The Modern Corporation and Private Property indeed concluded
by proclaiming that shareholders, “by surrendering control and responsibility
over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation
should be operated in their sole interest,—they have released the community
from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine
of strict property rights.”87 If “the corporate leaders . . . set forth a program
comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their
public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of
the profits from the owners of passive property,” the interests of the
latter “would have to give way.”88
For Berle, as it was for Justice Ostrander in Dodge, the duties those in

83. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 247–76 (1932).
86. Id. at 247.
87. Id. at 355.
88. Id. at 356.
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control owed minority investors were not inconsistent with the corporation’s
broader duties toward the community at large.89 An admirer of Louis
Brandeis’s work,90 Berle called for federal regulation, supplemented by
judicial enforcement of fiduciary obligations as a means of ensuring that
individual shareholders could safely invest. While he did not necessarily
believe in the ability of shareholders to participate in corporate management,
Berle strongly believed in the potential effectiveness of fiduciary duties.
Concerned that existing corporate statutes—especially the Delaware statute,
“whose drafting and enactment [Berle] attributed to powerful New York
business lawyers—gave managers extremely broad power without
accompanying statutory limitations,”91 Berle viewed shareholders’
disempowerment as a justification for imposing fiduciary duties on
management and the control group for the benefit of the corporation and
society.
Indeed, by promoting shareholder protection, albeit not
empowerment, Berle avoided addressing potential conflicts between the
shareholders’ perceptions of their interests and broader corporate goals.92
As the following Part II explores, in the midcentury years, minority
shareholders, informed by similar ideas yet more vocal about their interests,
began challenging directors’ and officers’ actions as violations of their
fiduciary obligations. In analyzing their cases, the courts developed the
contours of directors’ duties while also offering rhetoric to suggest that the
directors’ role was to maximize value for the shareholders. Part III will
explore how, in the 1980s, the Delaware courts embedded this rhetoric in
corporate law.
II. 1940S-1950S: THE INDIVIDUAL MINORITY SHAREHOLDER IN COURT
By the 1940s, concerns about the power of those in control dissipated
as the New Deal regulatory state took shape,93 and war-production helped
89. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 87 (2002). See also Rohrlich,
supra note 26, at 696 (“That the corporation itself is a trustee for the stockholders is well
settled. Nor is there any doubt that directors are ‘trustees’ for the corporation.”).
90. Jessica Wang, Neo-Brandeisianism and the New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William
O. Douglas and the Problem of Corporate Finance in the 1930s, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1221
(2010).
91. Leo Strine, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Belotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris,
Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 93 GEO. L. J.
629, 642 (2010).
92. For a detailed analysis of Berle’s approach, see Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1532–35.
93. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
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turn corporations and their managers from a threat to the American dream
into a vehicle for achieving the American democratic ideal.94 Corporate
litigation changed, too. Rather than a tool in the hands of well-to-do minority
shareholders against their corporation’s control group, bringing suits became
a means for minority shareholders to claim a place for themselves in
corporate America. Their arguments pushed the courts to (re)define the
duties of directors and officers and, if only in dicta, address their
responsibility to maximize profits for the shareholders.
Notably, the cases did not directly examine the question of corporate
purpose. As I have previously argued, midcentury cases explicitly analyzing
corporate purpose, most notably A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,95 embraced
the corporation as a quintessential American institution with obligations to
ensure the survival of American democracy, for example, through charitable
contributions.96 In turn, the cases addressing claims of breaches of fiduciary
obligations merely explained the appropriate role of corporate managers in
ways that also focused on their corporations’ profits.97 As courts relaxed the
standards of review by which directors’ actions were measured so as to
promote entrepreneurial freedom, they also sought to assure minority
shareholders that their corporations were run to their benefit. Balancing both
goals, the courts brought the question of profit to bear upon the developing
business judgment jurisprudence.

Thought, 76 GEO. L. J. 1593, 1688 (1988) (noting that after the New Deal “little was left of
the classical corporation” as the federal securities acts regulated its relationship with investors,
federal labor laws regulated its dealing with workers, and antitrust laws regulated its
relationship to consumers and suppliers).
94. See, e.g., SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 185–91 (1996) (detailing the change in opinion
towards the corporations and their managers).
95. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953).
96. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 182–87.
97. For analyses of corporate purpose and the law of fiduciary obligations, see generally
Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Governance,
10 U. ST. THOMAS. L. J. 974 (2013) (detailing the limited role corporate law has played in
impacting corporate responsibility); Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D.
Gordon Smith & Andrew Gold eds., 2016) (examining the connections between corporate
personhood, corporate purpose, and fiduciary duties to demonstrate that corporations have a
purpose beyond maximizing wealth for their shareholders); Jonathan Povilonis, The Use and
Misuse of Fiduciary Duties: Why Corporate Fiduciary Duties Aren’t Worth Fighting For,
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3752756 [https://perma.cc/M7SM-A5M2] (arguing that
fiduciary duties are limited in their scope and thus a poor means to advance corporate social
responsibility).
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A. “Nominal shareholders ‘having no real financial interest in the
corporation’”98
The debate between Berle and Dodd died as quickly as it began. The
market’s collapse in October 1929 brought home the devastating
consequences of the “feverish activity of speculation” that characterized the
1920s.99 The losses were tremendous. According to one report, “in the ten
years before 1933, total investor losses through worthless securities were
approximately $25 billion, or half of all those issued.”100 According to the
same report, even before the Depression, investors’ losses “reached a
staggering annual total of $1.7 billion, of which $500 million alone was
accounted for within the state of New York.”101
After the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress responded swiftly
with a variety of new federal laws, aiming to regulate securities, investment
banking and the investment industry. The Glass-Steagall Act, “prohibited
bank affiliates from owning and dealing in securities, thereby severing
commercial banks from investment banks.”102 The Securities Act of 1933
required issuance of new securities to be registered and “accompanied by
full publicity and information and that no essentially important element
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”103 The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 focused on the registration of the stock
exchanges and the requirement that firms traded on these exchanges file
annual and quarterly reports with a newly established agency, which the Act
created—the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Act further
prohibited certain manipulative devices such as short selling, which
corporate insiders and exchange members used to exploit the market, and it
regulated insider trading by both management and controlling
shareholders.104 Moreover, it limited the formation of control groups by
requiring individuals or groups owning more than five percent of a
corporation’s stock to file with the SEC.105 In order to prevent fraudulent
reporting, the Act also required “certified periodical audits for any
98. FRANKLIN WOOD, N.Y. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SURVEY AND REPORT REGRADING
STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 112 (1944).
99. RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 11 (1964).
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id.
102. Mark Roe, Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10,
17 (1991).
103. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 47 (1970)
(quoting from Roosevelt’s message in support of the first draft).
104. DE BEDTS, supra note 99, at 76–77.
105. Roe, supra note 102, at 25–27.
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corporation listing its securities on a national exchange.”106 As to the
shareholders’ role in the corporation—the 1934 Act put their fate in the
hands of the SEC, which was authorized to adopt rules regarding proxy
voting when appropriate “in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.”107
The number of individual shareholders continued to rise, although it
remained limited through the 1960s. After the crash, some investors,
especially those who only recently began investing, left the market; one
report noted that women “who once crowded brokerage desks in the
1920s . . . virtual[ly] disappear[ed] from the market” after the crash.108 Still,
by 1934, the House Report on the Securities Exchange bill estimated that
more than 10 million individuals owned stocks or bonds, and that “over one
fifth of all the corporate stock outstanding in the country [was] held by
individuals with net incomes of less than $5,000 a year.”109
For the most part, investors sought steady income and were advised to
focus on the intrinsic value of the corporation based on its specific
characteristics when making their investment decisions.110 Typically longterm investors, they also turned to the courts to ensure that directors fulfilled
their fiduciary obligations. As John Coffee explains, when individual
shareholders found themselves holding stock in larger and larger
corporations while having little if any sway over those in control, “[t]he
derivative action [became] the only legal remedy then available to
shareholders,” and its use rapidly increased.111 Minority shareholders, not
infrequently also of minority social and cultural status, or women, who
viewed investment in corporate stock as a means of economic as well as
social and cultural advancement, brought derivative suits not necessarily to
106. DE BEDTS, supra note 99, at 77.
107. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE. COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 99–100 (1982).
On the creation of the SEC, see id. at 73–100; PARRISH, supra note 103, at 108–44.
108. Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, supra note 39.
109. H.R. REP. NO. 73–1383, at 3 (1934).
110. Economists Benjamin Graham and David Dodd argued that investors could ensure
satisfactory returns by relying on fundamental valuation to assemble a portfolio of carefully
selected diversified stock. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS:
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE (1934); see also HO, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that the lack of
“volume on the Exchange” “indicates that even those who did own shares did not trade them
often; the dominant shareholding strategy was to hold stocks, to wait for shares to appreciate
slowly as generators of steady income”).
111. COFFEE, supra note 25, at 33; see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Laura Phillips Sawyer,
Voting Trusts and Antitrust: Rethinking the Role of Shareholder Litigation in Public
Regulation, From the 1880s to the 1930s, 39 L. & HIST. REV. 569, 577–83 (2021) (discussing
the use of derivative suits against anticompetitive mergers).
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enrich their pockets but rather to ensure that corporate managers acted in
their best interest, to ensure, perhaps, their place in corporate America.112
Notably, much of the litigation took place in the New York courts,113
where these shareholders were often represented by lawyers who were
descendants of recent immigrants.114 Many were Jewish, and their
commitment to the protection of minority shareholders was borne out of their
experiences of discrimination and exclusion in American society. Seeking
economic success and “excluded from . . . the elite corporate bar,” these
lawyers “turned to other forms of legal practice, including
challenging . . . corporations through derivative litigation . . . to make a
living.”115
The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York was sufficiently
concerned about the threat that these lawyers posed to its elite status that it
commissioned a study of a decade of derivative litigation in New York
courts. 116 Franklin Wood, who conducted the study and wrote a report based
upon it, concluded that “derivative actions were filed . . . by nominal
shareholders ‘having no real financial interest in the corporation.’”117
Accordingly, “the only one likely to profit substantially in the event of
success is the [plaintiff’s] attorney.”118 The Wood Report was particularly
critical of “the prominence of women among the plaintiffs and list[ed] those
suits which feature[d] women plaintiffs, . . . sarcastically speculat[ing] as to

112. While there is no aggregate data of investors by ethnicity or religion, many cases,
especially in NY, involved litigants with common Jewish surnames. For lists of cases in NY,
see appendices in WOOD, supra note 98. For an early-twentieth-century notion that investors
can use money to affect politics, see, for example, Power of Women Investors to Unite and
Prevent War, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1914, at 2.
113. In the midcentury, New York was the leading jurisdiction developing the duties of
directors. See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, Legitimating Power: A Brief History of Modern
U.S. Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY
LAW 510 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
114. At the time, “the plaintiff’s bar . . . consisted of solo practitioners and very small
firms.” COFFEE, supra note 25, at 38. The exception was Abe Pomeranz. Id; see also Spencer
Klaw, Abe Pomeranz is Watching You, FORTUNE, Feb. 1968, at 144.
115. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Gentleman’s Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of
Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=321680 [https
://perma.cc/NH4Q-RWXS], at 17–18 (George Washington Univ. L. Sch., Public Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 44, 2022), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.321680
[https://perma.cc/47T8-AAUT].
116. Robert B. Thompson, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 149 (2004). The report covered the years 1932 to 1942.
Id.
117. WOOD, supra note 98, at 112.
118. COFFEE, supra note 25, at 38–39.
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their financial sophistication and research behavior.”119 A majority of the
plaintiffs listed in the report also had Jewish surnames.120
Wood was not concerned about shareholder suits in closely held
corporations. Like Dodge v. Ford, suits involving the latter were “usually
brought by minority shareholders with a significant stake who alleged
misbehavior by the majority.”121 Instead, he focused on individual
shareholders in publicly held corporations. His goal was to demonstrate that
many derivative suits were “brought primarily for their nuisance value.”122
The Report recommended limiting standing in derivative litigation “to
shareholders who owned stock at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, and to
require the shareholder plaintiff to post security for costs in the event the
litigation were found to have been meritless.”123 Convinced by the Report,
the New York legislature passed section 61-b,124 “the nation’s first security
for expenses statute.”125
Criticism of the Report was mounted as soon as it was published,126 but
the impact of the legislation was limited.127 At the time, judges “were
probably more prepared to question managerial decisions than at any time
before or since.”128 As the following Section II.B. explores, while individual
shareholders rarely won a case, the questions their derivative litigation raised
provided fertile ground for judges to develop the law of fiduciary duties. As
judges embraced enabling rules, offering managers freedom to act, they also
119. Mitchell, supra note 115, at 35.
120. Id. at 35–36.
121. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis 9 (U. Pa. L. Sch.
Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027
010 [https://perma.cc/GM7L-5EUH].
122. Erickson, supra note 24, at 1141.
123. Skeel, supra note 121, at 9.
124. Act of April 9, 1944, ch. 668, § 61-b, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1455.
125. Id. Several states enacted similar restrictions, and by 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that “these state procedural statutes applied in federal court as well to corporations
incorporated in these states.” COFFEE, supra note 25, at 4041; see also Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–57 (1949) (holding that a New Jersey statute requiring
shareholder plaintiffs to post security for litigation costs applied in federal courts).
126. See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in
New York, 32 CAL. L. REV. 123 passim (1944) (criticizing the validity and accuracy of the
Wood Report).
127. Skeel, supra note 121, at 10 (“Although derivative litigation may indeed have been
chilled for a time, the prophesies of its demise were greatly exaggerated.”).
128. COFFEE, supra note 25, at 36. Notably, many of these New York judges were Jewish
(including Bernard Shientag, Albert Cohn, and Irving Lehman, whose opinions are discussed
in Section II.B below). For an attempt to “discern common themes in the judicial careers” of
Jewish judges who served on state courts, see Jeffrey B. Morris, The American Jewish Judge:
An Appraisal on the Occasion of the Bicentennial, 38 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 195 (1976).
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offered their observations about the corporations’ duty to maximize
shareholder value.
B. Managerial Freedom and Shareholder Protection
As we saw in Part I of this Article, Progressive legal scholars advocated
viewing those in control of business enterprises as trustees and imposing
strict fiduciary duties upon them. In 1928, Chief Judge Cardozo’s opinion
in Meinhard v. Salmon gave voice to such ideas, holding that “[a] trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior.”129
By the 1940s, however, courts were moving away from a strict rule of
prohibition toward one of balance. For one thing, a contract between a
corporation and its director could be valid if a disinterested majority of the
directors approved it, and it was not “unfair or fraudulent.”130 As the
Supreme Court of Delaware explained in Guth v. Loft, “[c]orporate officers
and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence
to further their private interests.”131 Yet, while “[t]he rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall
be no conflict between duty and self-interest,” “[t]he occasions for the
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied,
and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is
measured by no fixed scale.”132
In a few decades, tolerance gave way to acceptance if not sanction, as
courts held that transactions between a corporation and any or all its directors
were not “automatically voidable” whether or not a disinterested majority of
the board authorized them.133 Instead, courts subjected such transactions to
scrutiny under a test of fairness, a standard that one commentator described

129. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
130. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 39–40 (1966); see also Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate
Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335, 336 (1948) (noting that “the
courts seized upon the board of directors’ ability to act through a majority” to approve an
otherwise voidable self-dealing transactions).
131. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
132. Id. The case involved a lawsuit by Loft Inc. against Charles Guth, its president,
charging that Guth had taken to himself a corporate opportunity (a controlling investment in
Pepsi-Cola Enterprises). Id. at 508–09. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the lower
court’s ruling in favor of Guth. Id. at 515.
133. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 130.
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as “measured by the ‘Chancellor’s foot.’”134
The reasons for the development were manifold. In part, the courts
simply legitimated changes that corporations had begun to put in place
through charter provisions permitting self-dealing transactions, subject to the
requirements of independent authorization or absence of fraud. In part, the
rise of the large publicly held corporation, the passing of control from
directors to managers, as well as the rapid pace and “brutal” temper of
business ventures made a concept of trust appear “threadbare.”135 In part,
courts were simply recognizing the needs of business and their managers;136
seeking to allow managers and the control group to balance the corporation’s
interests with their own, courts moved away from trust toward fairness as the
appropriate standard for evaluating conflict-of-interest transactions.
Placing this transformation in a broader historical context, legal
historian William Nelson has argued that courts were addressing cultural and
social ends beyond the realm of corporate law. In his thorough examination
of politics and ideology in New York courts, Nelson argued that the law of
fiduciary obligations was historically a tool “to protect property rights and
the existing distributions of wealth, on the one hand, and to uphold moral
values, on the other.”137 According to Nelson, in the midcentury years,
judges relaxed the strict requirements applied to fiduciaries so as to enable
new entrepreneurs, who were often descendants of turn-of-the-century
Catholic and Jewish immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, to enter
the mainstream of American life.138
As Nelson explores, judges “fostered . . . upward mobility” when
holding
[T]hat a corporate officer or director, if acting in good faith, may
134. Note, supra note 130, at 337. The difference between trust and fairness was
significant. A trust standard of review required voiding transactions between the corporation
and a director or an officer simply because they involved the self-interest of the latter. In turn,
the fairness standard of review allowed courts to validate such transactions, even though they
involved the self-interest of the fiduciary, if the result of such transactions was fair to the
corporation.
135. Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Story and the Modern Corporation—A Closing Circle?, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 262, 265 (1973).
136. See, e.g., S. Side Trust Co. v. Wash. Tin Plate Co., 97 A 450, 451 (Pa. 1916) (“The
Interests of corporations are sometimes so interwoven that it is desirable to have joint
representatives in their respective managements, and at any rate it is a not uncommon and not
unlawful practice.”).
137. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN
NEW YORK 1920–1980, at 60 (2001).
138. Id. at 178; see also William E. Nelson, The Law of Fiduciary Duty in New York,
1920–1980, 53 SMU L. REV. 285, 285–86 (2000) (describing the increased freedom given by
judges to money managers to facilitate the mobility of new entrepreneurs).
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profit from dealings with the corporation if the corporation also
profits; . . . that honest reliance on advice of counsel protected
directors from personal liability; that “policies of expansion”
justified nonpayment of dividends; . . . and that, in the absence of
loss of corporate funds or of personal profit to itself, management
could authorize a corporation to purchase its own stock in the open
market in order to perpetuate management’s control.139
As already noted, often, not only the defendants but also the plaintiffs,
the shareholders who sought stricter application of fiduciary obligations,
were first- and second-generation Americans (and some were also women).
Judges were thus pressed to develop pragmatic solutions that would address
the needs of both fiduciaries and beneficiaries. To that end, as courts moved
away from strict enforcement of trust toward the more relaxed standard of
fairness, judges also opined about the directors’ duty to ensure that
corporations remained profitable for the benefit of their shareholders. As I
argue below, these statements about profits planted the seeds that in the
1980s sprouted to become the shareholder wealth maximization norm.140
Bayer v. Beran is the most emblematic of these cases. A derivative
litigation against the Celanese Corporation of America (“Company”), it was
instigated by two of the Company’s public shareholders,141 Seymour Bayer
and Benjamin F. Steinberg, who challenged actions by the Company’s board
and sought to recover $1,350,000 for the Company.142
The Company was founded by Dr. Camile Dreyfus, a chemist and an
immigrant from Switzerland, who developed a variety of cellulose-based
products and, with his brother, Henri, set up “three great enterprises,” namely
British Celanese Ltd., Canadian Celanese Ltd., and, in 1918, the company
that would become Celanese Corporation of America. Camille was
“president of the American concern[,] . . . managing director of the British

139. Nelson, supra note 138, at 297–98.
140. See also NELSON, supra note 137, at 178 (“In particular, the courts grew more tolerant
of higher-risk investment practices of entrepreneurial fiduciaries who were seeking to increase
income and grow principal and less concerned with ensuring the security of investments.”).
141. At the time of the trial, there were 1,376,500 shares outstanding; the Dreyfus brothers
and their families owned about 135,000 shares of common stock, the other directors about
10,000 shares, and the rest of the shares were publicly held. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2,
9 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
142. Singer’s Career Issue in Suit for $1,350,000, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1943, at 22.
Steinberg was represented by Abraham M. Glickman and Beyer by A. Lincoln Lavine, a
Professor of Law and Chairman of the Law Department of St. John’s University School of
Commerce.
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company and president of the Canadian.”143
Bayer’s and Steinberg’s complaint focused on an approval of a radio
advertising campaign in which Jean Tennyson, a professional opera singer
and Camille’s wife, was sometimes featured.144 The campaign was initiated
after the Federal Trade Commission issued a new rule, requiring Celanese to
be labeled rayon; the campaign’s implicit goal was to convince consumers
that Celanese was indeed better than rayon. The shareholders argued, first,
that the directors were negligent in approving the campaign and, second, that
they approved the campaign to further the career of the president’s wife.145
(The shareholders’ other complaint focused on “certain payments of $30,000
a year made to Henri Dreyfus, one of its vice-presidents and a director,
pursuant to a contract of employment entered into with him by the
corporation.”146)
Justice Bernard Lloyd Shientag of the Supreme Court of New York,
known for his “broad humanitarian sympathies,”147 wrote the court’s
opinion. Aware of the growing concerns about the derivative suit, and
seeking perhaps to encourage minority shareholders to bring them, Justice
Shientag began his decision by noting:
Despite abuses that have developed in connection with the
derivative stockholders’ suit, abuses which should be dealt with
promptly and effectively, it must be remembered that such an
action is, at present, the only civil remedy that stockholders have
for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of those entrusted with the
management and direction of their corporations. We cannot
therefore allow the prevailing mood of justifiable dissatisfaction
with some of the temporary incidents of such suits to cause us to
lose sight of certain deep-rooted, traditional concepts of the
obligations of directors to their corporation and its stockholders.148
Then, after a careful analysis of the facts, Shientag, eager to encourage
managerial freedom, dismissed the complaint on the merits, holding that “the
directors acted in the free exercise of their honest business judgment and
their conduct in the transactions challenged did not constitute negligence,
143. Camille Dreyfus of Celanese Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1956, at 27. In 1930,
common and preferred stock of the Celanese Corporation of America began trading on the
New York Stock Exchange. https://www.celanese.com/en/About-Us/History/1921-1950 [htt
ps://perma.cc/C2YS-KYSV].
144. Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4.
147. James McGurrin, Tribute to Justice Shientag, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 1952, at 26.
148. Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 4–5.
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waste or improvidence.”149
Nonetheless, and perhaps because he dismissed the minority
shareholders’ complaint, Shientag’s opinion emphasized two factors related
to the responsibility of directors and officers to maximize shareholders’
value. First, Shientag elaborated on the standard of fairness by which
transactions involving directors’ or officers’ conflict of interest should be
evaluated. Ms. Tennyson advised Dreyfus and helped create the advertising
campaign, which consisted of a radio program offering classical music. She
was also one of the singers on the program. Yet, while the advertising
campaign was tainted with a conflict of interest, Shientag found it to be fair
to the corporation. As he pointedly noted, “It would be far-fetched to suggest
that the directors caused the company to incur large expenditures for radio
advertising to enable the president’s wife to make $24,000 in 1942 and
$20,500 in 1943.”150
As to the claim that the directors did not meet to approve the campaign
and thus failed to fulfil their duty of care, Shientag pointed out that the
directors, all of whom were also executives, were sufficiently informed.
Supporting his conclusion, Shientag wrote:
While a greater degree of formality should undoubtedly be
exercised in the future, it is only just and proper to point out that
these directors, with all their loose procedure, have done very well
for the corporation. Under their administration the company has
thrived and prospered. Its assets increased from $44,500,000 in
1935 to upwards of $103,000,000 in 1942. Its net profits, after
taxes, doubled during that period, rising from $4,000,000 in 1935
to $8,000,000 in 1942; its net sales rose from $27,000,000 to
upwards of $86,000,000; and its dividend disbursements to
stockholders exceeded $29,500,000.151
While irrelevant to the legal analysis of directors’ duties, profit
mattered. Other cases, addressing a variety of duty-of-loyalty and duty of
care claims similarly balanced the interests of managers and shareholders,
shielding the former from liability while assuring the latter that their
corporations were profitable.
Litwin v. Allen, which preceded Bayer, was a derivative suit brought by
Eva Litwin, a minority shareholder, represented by Abraham N. Geller, a
practitioner based in New York.152 Writing for the court, Justice Shientag
stressed that “a director owes loyalty and allegiance to the company—a
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
On Geller, see Judge Who Jailed Quill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1966.
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loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
consideration other than the welfare of the corporation.”153 Moreover, “[i]n
the discharge of his duties a director must, of course, act honestly and in good
faith, but that is not enough. He must also exercise some degree of skill and
prudence and diligence.”154 Yet, a careful and detailed consideration of the
facts led Shientag to reject three of the plaintiff’s four claims. “The law
recognizes that the most conservative director is not infallible,” Shientag
wrote, “and that he will make mistakes.”155 So long as a director used “that
degree of care ordinarily exercised by prudent [directors of similar
corporations, here bankers] he will be absolved from liability although his
opinion may turn out to have been mistaken and his judgment faulty.”156
Significantly, while the question of profit was not dispositive of any of
the issues raised in the case, it was important for Shientag, at the beginning
of the discussion to note:
[P]laintiffs have conceded that in all but the four questioned
transactions the defendants exercised an unusual degree of care in
the management of the Trust Company. This is reflected in the
financial condition of the Trust Company.
For example,
beginning with 1930 (the year after the merger of Guaranty Trust
Company and National Bank of Commerce), its deposits increased
from $1,341,639,876 to $2,088,427,346 in 1939. In the same
interval its total assets more than doubled. Despite the depression
the Trust Company’s figures of capital, surplus and undivided
profits remained substantially the same between 1930 and 1939,
being $297,442,797 in the former year and $274,701,954 in the
latter year.157
Similarly, in Turner v. American Metal Co., a derivative suit brought
by shareholders holding “165 out of a total over 1,200,000 shares of common
stock” of their corporation,158 who argued that the directors usurped
corporate opportunity, Judge Albert Cohn for the New York Appellate Court
stressed that “[t]he law is well settled that minority stockholders may not
interfere with the management of a corporation so long as the trustees are
acting honestly and within their discretionary powers.”159 Moreover, “the
mere existence of . . . a divided loyalty did not, of itself, warrant the

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677 (1940).
Id. at 677–78.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id. at 676–77.
Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 A.D. 239, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
Id. at 271.
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imposition of liability against directors.”160 Accordingly, “lean[ing] in the
direction of enhancing the entrepreneurial freedom of business managers,”161
Cohn did not find the directors to have breached the trust.162 Recognizing
perhaps that its decision left the minority shareholders without remedy, Cohn
added, in dicta, that the parent company made profit as a result of the
challenged transaction. “The financing of Climax, from American Metal’s
point of view, was distinctly profitable,” he concluded.163
The balance seemed attainable: directors were free to act, protected by
the presumption of the business judgment rule, so long as, in the balance of
equities, their companies were profitable. Corporate managers were offered
a protective fairness standard while minority shareholders were given a
protective rhetoric. As the following Part III explores, by the 1960s, as
concerns about upward mobility and the economic assimilation of secondgeneration Americans subsided, the business judgment presumption came to
dominate corporate litigation and the discussion of profits receded. It
resurfaced in the Delaware courts amid the hostile takeovers of the 1980s as
shareholder wealth maximization became a tool in the hands of Wall Street
lawyers and investment bankers seeking to enrich their clients.
III. 1960S-1980S: FAIRNESS AND PROFIT IN THE AGE OF FINANCE
By the 1950s, corporate managements became the “strategic center” of
the large publicly held corporation.164 Management dominated the corporate
bureaucracy, organized production, and exercised power over individual
lives within the corporation and market transactions outside it.165 Modern
finance theory and neoclassical economics, both developed in the 1960s,
helped legitimate the role of corporate directors and executives by suggesting
that the stock market would tame potential abuses of managerial power.166
During the 1980s, as hostile takeovers attempted to make the ideal of the
160. Id. at 272; see also, Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942), in
which Chief Judge Irving Lehman, for the court, concluded that the dual position of the
directors, while “making the unprejudiced exercise of judgment by them more difficult,” did
not in itself “suffice to render the transactions void.”
161. NELSON, supra note 137, at 180.
162. Turner, 268 A.D. 239.
163. Id. at 264; see also id. at 272 (“The decision of the directors of American Metal to
render . . . assistance to Climax . . ., was fully justified. Climax made no profits ‘at the expense’
of American Metal and the success of [Climax] . . . resulted in a net profit to American Metal
of more than $16,000,000.”).
164. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989).
165. Id.
166. See discussion infra notes 176-178.
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market as regulator a reality, the Delaware courts responded by making
shareholder wealth maximization, in fact share price maximization, an aspect
of the fairness standard of review as well as the enhanced scrutiny to which
directors’ responses to hostile bids were subjected. Revlon was the result.167
A. Changing Tides
Through the postwar years, stock ownership was not widespread—less
than five percent of the population owned stock—and corporations relied
upon earnings and, to a more limited extent, external financing from banks
to fund their operations.168 Trading volume was also low, indicating that
midcentury shareholders preferred long-term investment.169 In May 1947,
the New York Stock Exchange, seeking to encourage Americans to invest in
common stock, placed ads portraying American shareholders as “com[ing]
from everywhere . . . from every income group, from every community.
They are women as well as men, employees as well as executives, farmers
as well as businessmen. They are typical stockholders, the owners of
business.”170 The campaign expanded in the following years, as the
Exchange sought to market stock as a means, among others to fight
communism, socialism, and fascism.171 The bullish market growth in the
succeeding decade confirmed the success of the campaign.172 In 1952, 6.5
million people owned stock, “by 1956, the total was 8.6 million; by 1959,
12.5 million, [b]y 1962 . . . the number . . . reached an impressive 17
million.”173 As the New York Times reported:

167. On the role of the Delaware courts in the 1980s, see, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall
S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in
Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 324 (2018) (noting that “[t]he 1980s is . .
. considered the Golden Age of Delaware corporate law. During that era, the Delaware courts
won international attention . . . by interjecting a fresh perspective on the rights of owners and
the prerogatives of managers.”).
168. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical Evidence
12–15 (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403 [https://perma.c
c/3WL4-86S5]. As Mitchell notes, “external financing in general only began to grow from
the turn of the twentieth century on, but almost all of that growth was in various forms of
debt.” Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
169. HO, supra note 7, at 200–01.
170. J. A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE
WORKINGS OF TODAY’S STOCK-MARKET 21 (rev. ed. 1963) (1957).
171. Janice Traflet, “Own Your Share of American Business”: Public Relations at the
NYSE During the Cold War, 1 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 1, 3–4 (2003), http://www.thebhc.org/site
s/default/files/ Traflet_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX8A-FN7D].
172. LIVINGSTON, supra note 170, at 21–23.
173. Id. at 23.
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Part of this increase is attributable to employee‐participation plans,
part to the increased popularity of investment companies, which
permit a purchaser to spread his risks while buying only one issue.
Nearly a quarter of a million holders have been attracted by the
widely publicized Monthly Investment Plan—the application of
installment buying to stock ownership. But most of the increase
must be credited to greater affluence (more families with savings
to invest) and, apparently, to a belief that the market can only go
up.174
The development of modern finance theory coincided with the efforts
of the Exchange. As mentioned in Part II above, in the first part of the
twentieth century, as corporations sought to create a market for their stock,
investors were advised to focus on the intrinsic value of
corporations.175 Beginning in the 1950s, however, modern portfolio theory,
developed by Harry Markowitz, suggested that investors could create “an
efficient portfolio,” that is, a portfolio that would achieve maximum
return by diversifying non-systematic risk, and that the portfolio, rather than
individual corporations, should be the focus of investment analysis.176 The
Capital Asset Pricing Model, which William Sharpe and John Lintner
developed in the 1960s, offered a regression analysis of a stock’s historical
movement in relation to the market to help investors diversify the systematic
risk inherent in the market. Rather than study the fundamentals of
companies in which they were interested, investors were advised to study the
historical performance of their companies’ stock price.177 As Ronald Gilson
and Jeffrey Gordon have demonstrated, the need to ensure ample
diversification of both systematic and non-systematic risks led investors to
choose mutual funds over direct investment in corporate stock; within a few
decades, the percentage of households that owned equities through mutual
funds dramatically increased.178
174. Michael Reagan, What 17 Million Shareholders Share, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1964, at
11.
175. See discussion supra note 110.
176. James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial Crisis of 2008: An
Intellectual History of Corporate Finance Theory, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1257, 1260–62
(2010).
177. Kent L. Womack & Ying Zhang, Understanding Risk and Return, the CAPM, and
Fama-French Three-Factor Model, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=481881 [https://perma.cc/M9JH-SXC5]; see also Roberta Romano, After the
Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 345 (2005).
178. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 884
(2013). Gilson and Gordon also note that, while the percentage of
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Informed by modern finance theory, academic attention shifted from
concerns about corporate power and the power of the control group to the
market as the sole means of regulating the economy. The University of
Chicago, in particular, “had become the intellectual home of the idea that
markets, not the state, were the proper and most benign central institution of
postwar society. . . .”179 Drawing on microeconomics, a new theory of the
firm painted a picture of the corporation as a nexus of private, contractual
relationships. The corporation was a collection of “disaggregated but
interrelated transactions” among individuals or the convenient fiction of
corporate entity in free and efficient markets.180
The new theory of the firm supported a shift of focus in jurisprudence—
from questions of power and control to issues of agency-costs reduction.181
Its proponents reframed the problem of the modern corporation as the
problem of the separation of ownership from control and sought to
demonstrate how capital markets could eliminate concerns about efficiency
associated with this separation.182 Fiduciary obligations were seen as overly
restrictive, corporate litigation was deemed wasteful, and dissatisfied
shareholders seeking to ensure that corporate managers act in their best
interests were told to exercise their voting power or to sell their shares.183
In this context, judges’ focus shifted from balancing managerial
freedom with assurances to minority shareholders about profits toward
upholding directors’ actions unless the plaintiff shareholder carried the
burden of rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule. The
“reification of the business judgment rule,” William Nelson writes,
households that directly own equities has remained about 20% since the late 1970s, mutual
funds investment (including but not limited to retirement investment) “has increased the
percentage of households that own equities directly or through mutual funds by 30% to a total
of 50%” by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Id. Moreover, while in
the 1950s, “[e]quities were still held predominantly by households” with institutional
investors holding “only approximately 6.1% of U.S. equities,” by the 1980s, “institutional
investors held 28.4% of U.S. equities.” Id. at 874. By the end of the first decade of the twentyfirst century, “institutional investors held 50.6% of all U.S. public equities, and 73% of the
equity of the thousand largest U.S. corporations.” Id.
179. NICHOLAS LEMANN, TRANSACTION MAN: THE RISE OF THE DEAL AND THE DECLINE OF
THE AMERICAN DREAM 102 (2019).
180. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 416–20 (1989).
181. Bratton, supra note 164, at 1498.
182. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 212–15 (2005).
183. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in
Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964) (discussing the impact of share
voting on corporate decisions and the fact that votes are bought and sold in the corporate
system).
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“probably gave judges a better basis than they previously possessed for
declining to enforce the duty of loyalty, with its focus ultimately on issues
of equity between shareholders, and instead, deciding cases ‘on the practical
basis’ that entrepreneurs should be left free to manage corporations
efficiently. . . .”184
Take for example Shlensky v. Wrigley.185 William Shlensky, “a 27year-old Chicago lawyer, who has owned two shares [of the Chicago Cubs
stock] since he was 14,” brought derivative suit against the directors of the
Cubs, a Delaware corporation.186 According to Shlensky, the Cubs suffered
operating losses because of inadequate attendance at their home games. He
attributed the inadequate attendance to the directors’ refusal to install lights
at Wrigley Field and schedule night baseball games. Philip Wrigley, the
Cubs’ president and controlling shareholder (he owned approximately 80%
of the Cubs’ stock) had “steadfastly . . . kept Wrigley Field the only major
league park without lights because he insist[ed] that baseball [was] a day
game and night ball would be a nuisance to Wrigley Field neighbors.”187
Shlensky argued that the directors “have acquiesced in the policy laid down
by Wrigley,” allowing him “to dominate the board of directors in matters
involving the installation of lights and scheduling of night games, even
though they knew he was not motivated by a good faith concern as to the
best interests of the . . . corporation.”188
The Illinois Appellate Court, applying Delaware law, quickly dismissed
Shlensky’s claim, holding that “there must be fraud or a breach of that good
faith which directors are bound to exercise toward the stockholders in order
to justify the courts entering into the internal affairs of corporations.”189
Then, in dicta, and without needing to address the question, the court added:
We feel that plaintiff’s amended complaint was also defective in
failing to allege damage to the corporation. . . There is no
allegation that the night games played by the other nineteen teams
enhanced their financial position or that the profits, if any, of those
teams were directly related to the number of night games
scheduled. There is an allegation that the installation of lights
and scheduling of night games in Wrigley Field would have
resulted in large amounts of additional revenues and incomes from
increased attendance and related sources of income. Further, the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Nelson, supra note 138, at 297.
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173 (1968).
Stockholder of Cubs Hopes to See the Light, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1966, at 46.
Id.
Shlensky, 95 Ill. App.2d at 176.
Id. at 180.

2022]

SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

733

cost of installation of lights, funds for which are allegedly readily
available by financing, would be more than offset and recaptured
by increased revenues. However, no allegation is made that there
will be a net benefit to the corporation from such action,
considering all increased costs.190
Digging even deeper into the affairs of the Cubs, despite the court’s
admission that the directors were entitled to the protective presumption of
the business judgment rule, Justice Sullivan explained that while Shlensky
claimed that “the losses of defendant corporation are due to poor attendance
at home games,” it seemed that other factors contributed to the team losses.
“For example, in 1962, attendance at home and road games decreased
appreciably as compared with 1961, and yet the loss from direct baseball
operation and of the whole corporation was considerably less.”191 As
Sullivan concluded, Shlensky “did not feel he could allege that the increased
revenues would be sufficient to cure the corporate deficit,” and the court
would not “speculate as to what other factors might influence the increase or
decrease of profits if the Cubs were to play night home games.”192
Managerial freedom trumped shareholder interests. “Directors are
elected for their business capabilities and judgment,” Sullivan wrote in
Shlensky.193 Moreover, as Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York elaborated in Doglow v.
Anderson, shareholder litigation risked putting “many managers of large
enterprises. . . . some of them . . . men of relatively limited financial
resources who have risen quickly and recently through the technical ranks
because of their skill and optimism” in “an intolerable position.” 194 While,
like Shientag in the 1940s, Weinstein stressed that there was no need to “be
unduly concerned that small shareholders will misuse the class action device
by bringing strike suits,”195 he ultimately concluded that “[a] rule of law too
restrictive and inflexible may over inhibit and dampen [the] drive” of the

190. Id. at 181–82.
191. Id. at 182.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 183.
194. Doglow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
195. Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that “most
shareholders” of publicly held corporations “own comparatively few shares of stock,” and
that “the few persons who do own a substantial bloc of stock in a corporation are usually
either officers, directors, or other ‘insiders’—. . . the very people whose conduct the securities
laws are designed to regulate. . . . [T]o restrict the use of the class action to those persons
would virtually preclude its application in the area of securities regulation.”).
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new entrepreneurs, “without providing gain to the investor. . . .”196
No longer looking to assure minority shareholders that their
corporations were maximizing profit, courts required shareholders not only
to prove that directors’ actions amounted to the dereliction of their duty of
loyalty but also that they caused damage to the corporation, a formidable
task. Discussions of shareholder profit maximization seemed to be put to
rest. Yet, as the following sections III.B and III.C explore, they were
resurrected in the 1980s, with a twist.
B. Fairness as Fair Price
By the 1980s, the business judgment rule seemed synonymous with
corporate law. As Judge Winter writing for the Second Circuit explained,
shareholders voluntarily assumed the risks of business failures (and the
potential for success). Because rational shareholders would offset their
exposure to business misfortunes by diversifying their portfolios (as modern
finance theory dictated), corporate law did not need to protect them from
such letdowns.197 Allowing finance and markets to trump law, the Delaware
courts further justified shielding directors from liability by expressing
concerns about the potential devastating effects of heightened liability on the
willingness of competent directors to serve on boards.198
The election of Ronald Reagan cemented free economic and political
markets as the cornerstones of American democracy. As Kent Greenfield
writes, “Reagan embodied a new Zeitgeist. He railed against government
regulation, took pride in breaking up the power of public-sector unions, and
ushered in an era in which people were encouraged to feel good about
making money.”199 While Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal focused on
providing for the vulnerable in our society, a focus that carried through the
postwar years, “Reagan ushered in the 1980s proclaiming, ‘What I want to
see above all is that this country remains a country where someone can
196. Doglow, 53 F.R.D. at 686; see also Nelson, supra note 138, at 297 (discussing Judge
Weinstein’s opinion in Doglow v. Anderson).
197. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2nd Cir. 1982) (“Shareholders can reduce the
volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. . . . [C]ourts need not bend over backwards to
give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not
diversifying.”).
198. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(noting that it was “in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer sufficient protection to
directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical
matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards
of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business loss”).
199. KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO 44–45 (2018).
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always get rich.’”200
The stock market became a tool for fulfilling Reagan’s promise. After
the bull market of the 1960s helped keep the growing numbers of investors
satisfied, in the 1970s, “the stock market slumped.”201 Because “stocks fell
to five or six times earnings and often traded for less than a company’s book
value,” hostile takeovers became feasible, as raiders could offer premium
above market price, and “[t]he outlay could be recouped in a half-dozen
years—or even sooner, by selling off some of the acquired assets.”202 Seizing
the opportunity, investment bankers were quick to justify hostile takeovers
by spinning “a compelling narrative of how in the postwar era an elite,
complacent, and self-serving managerial class squandered corporate
resources extravagantly on themselves or on ill-advised expansions.”203
Accordingly, a primary goal of the takeover movement was “‘unlocking’ the
value of ‘underperforming’ stock prices” to the benefit of the victims in this
narrative—the shareholders.204
The takeover boom that followed revolutionized investment banking,
as “mergers-and-acquisitions departments [moved] from back room
operations . . . into operations that came to rival corporate-finance
departments in size—and profits.”205 “Investment bankers, perfecting their
sophisticated skills,” Paul Hoffmann writes, “superseded the legal
mercenaries as the strategists of tender-offer raids and the tacticians of
takeover defense.”206 These investment bankers, focused on increasing the
value of their portfolios, and institutional investors, keen on achieving the
same, were able to use hostile takeovers to force corporations “to choose
between shareholder value and other alternatives of corporate
governance.”207 As Karen Ho explains, by creating an “unprecedented
environment where all the largest corporations were up for grabs to the
highest stock-price bidder,” promoters of shareholder wealth maximization
forced these corporations “to be immediately responsive to the exigencies of
the stock market.”208
According to one report, “two thousand corporate takeovers a year

200.
201.
(1984).
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 45.
PAUL HOFFMAN, THE DEALMAKERS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF INVESTMENT BANKING 143
Id.
HO, supra note 7, at 130.
Id. at 130.
HOFFMAN, supra note 201, at 142.
Id. at 141.
HO, supra note 7, at 129.
Id. at 129.
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valued at more than $1 million” took place between 1981 and 1983.209 Stock
price became the medium for evaluating corporate performance and the
ultimate corporate goal. Corporations began using their retained earnings
and debt to return value to shareholders, defend against hostile tender offers,
and finance successful takeovers.210 Before long, the Delaware courts
embraced stock price as indicative of managerial efficiency and embedded it
in the standard of review applicable to directors’ actions, namely fairness. A
trilogy of cases authored by Justice Andrew G.T. Moore—Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 211 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.212 and Revlon213—led the way.
Weinberger was first in the trilogy, and the first case to make explicit
the connection between directors’ duties and stock price; it remains the
definitive case with respect to the fairness standard of review.214 A class
action,215 Weinberger addressed “the elimination of UOP’s minority
shareholders by a cash-out merger between UOP and its majority owner, The
Signal Companies, Inc.”216 In determining the price per share it was willing
to offer the public shareholders of UOP, Signal used a feasibility study
conducted by two of Signal’s members on the UOP board. The study
revealed that the merger would be beneficial to Signal at any price up to $24
per share.217 The study was never disclosed to the other members of the UOP
board or to UOP’s shareholders before they approved the merger at $21 per

209. LEMANN, supra note 179, at 116. According to Lemann, “[d]uring the 1980s as a
whole, more than a quarter of the companies on the Fortune 500 list of the country’s largest
corporations were subject to takeover attempts . . . There were thirty-five thousand of these
transactions, worth $2.6 trillion, between 1976 and 1990.” Id.
210. See Mitchell, supra note 168 (providing and examining the empirical evidence
supporting this argument).
211. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
212. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
213. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
214. On the fairness remedy in parent-subsidiary mergers prior to Weinberger, see Victor
Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) (stating that a “parent stands in a fiduciary relationship to the
subsidiary’s public stockholders” but, as of 1974, courts have rarely extended “fiduciary
safeguards beyond the point of simple fraud”). For developments after Weinberger, see, e.g.,
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), designating the business judgment
rule as the standard of review when a majority owner conditions a cash-out merger upon the
approval of “both an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee [of the
subsidiary’s board] that fulfills its duty of care, and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority
of the minority stockholders [of the subsidiary].”).
215. On the shift from derivative litigation to class actions in the postwar years, see
generally COFFEE, supra note 25, at 52–94 (discussing the emergence of class actions).
216. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
217. Id. at 705.
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share.218 The shareholders alleged that Signal and its representatives on UOP
board breached their duty of loyalty to UOP and its public shareholders.219
At the time, there were few Delaware cases addressing fundamental
transactions. As Marty Lipton notes, “the law was essentially around control
shareholders and what was expected of control shareholders and corporate
opportunity.”220 Attempting, perhaps, to fit Weinberger in this framework,
the Supreme Court of Delaware explained that the actions of Signal and its
appointed directors on the UOP board were sufficient to require that the
controlling shareholder and the board prove the entire fairness of the
transaction.221 “When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides
of a transaction,” Justice Moore, a Wilmington attorney for 18 years before
his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1982,222 wrote, “they are required
to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent
fairness of the bargain.”223
The meaning of fairness was a variation on the midcentury’s ideal.
Seeking to offer a clearer definition of the concept of fairness in the new age
of finance, Justice Moore made stock price one of the elements for evaluating
fairness. As he held:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to
the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or
inherent value of a company’s stock.224
Two years later, in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., the new fairness
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Peter Atkins et al., Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Insights from Practice: Did Delaware Get
It Right or Mess Up in Addressing the Takeover Boom of the 1980s? (Sept 25, 2018).
221. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. Because in cash-out mergers, statutory appraisal was
already available to dissenting shareholders, the court limited their ability to demand that the
directors prove the fairness of the transaction. The court held that before requiring the
directors or controlling shareholders to demonstrate the entire fairness of the cash-out merger,
the plaintiff shareholder “must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items
of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority.” Id.
222. Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Dies at 83, WBOC, https://www.wboc.co
m/story/39638199/former-delaware-supreme-court-justice-dies-at-83 [https://perma.cc/Y9Q
L-8MS5].
223. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
224. Id. at 711.
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standard was brought to bear upon the Delaware courts’ analyses of hostile
tender offers.225 Unocal was the first case to address the board’s duties when
faced with a hostile takeover. Mesa, “the owner of approximately 13% of
Unocal’s stock,” initiated “a two-tier ‘front loaded’ cash tender offer for 64
million shares, or approximately 37% of Unocal’s outstanding stock at a
price of $54 per share. The ‘back-end’ was designed to eliminate the
remaining publicly held shares by an exchange of [highly subordinated]
securities purportedly worth $54 per share.”226 The Unocal board determined
that the price Mesa offered was inadequate, and “that Unocal should pursue
a self-tender to provide the stockholders with a fairly priced alternative to
the Mesa proposal.”227 Mesa was not permitted to tender its stock into
Unocal’s self-tender.228
Given that Unocal’s directors would most likely be replaced should
Mesa succeed in its hostile tender offer to Unocal’s shareholders, the
decision of Unocal’s board to adopt a defensive tactic, on its face, was tainted
with a conflict of interest. Inside directors, in particular, were likely to be
concerned about losing their livelihood. (While outsiders might experience
reputational loss, their well-paid positions were with their own corporations,
corporations where they were insiders.) Given the potential conflict of
interest, a decision by a board to engage in a defensive tactic should have
been analyzed under the fairness test like any other form of self-dealing. In
this vein, the Court of Chancery “temporarily restrain[ed] Unocal from
proceeding with the exchange offer unless it included Mesa.”229
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed. Rather than
imposing on Unocal’s directors the burden to prove the entire fairness of the
transaction, Justice Moore, writing for the court, adopted a more lenient
test—a two prong test assessing, first, whether the directors “had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed” and, second, whether the defensive tactic the board adopted was
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”230
Then, holding that “the selective exchange offer [was] reasonably
related to the threats posed,” Justice Moore added:
It is consistent with the principle that “the minority stockholder
225. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
226. Id. at 949.
227. Id. at 950.
228. Id. at 950–51.
229. Id. at 952.
230. Id. at 946, 955. As the court further emphasized, if a majority of the independent
directors endorsed the defensive tactic, then the board’s action would likely meet the burden
of the test. Id. at 955.
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shall receive the substantial equivalent in value of what he had
before” . . . This concept of fairness, while stated in the merger
context, is also relevant in the area of tender offer law. Thus, the
board’s decision to offer what it determined to be the fair value of
the corporation to the 49% of its shareholders, who would
otherwise be forced to accept highly subordinated “junk bonds,”
is reasonable and consistent with the directors’ duty to ensure that
the minority stockholders receive equal value for their shares.231
Fairness, a standard of review intended to ensure protection to the
corporation and its minority shareholders when those in control engaged in
self-dealing transactions, was linked to the maximization of stock price and
made a tool in the hands of the board seeking to defend against a hostile
takeover. As the following section III.C elaborates, by the mid-1980s, gone
were also the individual minority shareholder litigants, and in their place,
large corporations, often at the behest of their controlling shareholders,
became the direct beneficiaries of fairness and the shareholder wealth
maximization rhetoric, more broadly. In the hostile-takeovers context, a
discourse that originated in the New York courts’ equitable considerations
became a means of protecting the powerful. Revlon, the last case in the
trilogy, made it so.
C. Fairness and Upward Mobility, Revisited
Ronald Perelman’s battle to acquire Revlon Industries had all the
makings of a good story.232 Michel Christian Bergerac, Revlon’s CEO, was
“a French-born deal maker.”233 He “studied political science and law in
Paris. He was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to study business at the
University of California, Los Angeles, where he earned an M.B.A. He
became an American citizen in the early 1960s.”234 Described as “a great
raconteur, who knew so much about so many things like wine and
art,” Bergerac managed Revlon since 1974, and expanded it “beyond its core
cosmetics business, transforming it into a major player in the health care
industry.”235
Perelman, Bergerac’s nemesis, was a third-generation Jewish
American; born in North Carolina, not “with a silver spoon in his mouth.
231. Id. at 956–57 (emphasis added).
232. The New York Times described it as “[o]ne of the pivotal corporate battles of modern
times.” Robert J, Cole, High-Stakes Drama at Revlon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1985.
233. Michel C. Bergerac, Who Made Over Revlon, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2016.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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More like a sterling place setting for eight,” he was raised in Elkins Park,
Pennsylvania.236 Perelman’s father, Raymond Perelman, was a businessman
and philanthropist; he raised his son, Ronald, “to understand the intricacies
of balance sheets and cash flow,” and expected him to join the family
growing business.237 “By the time he was eleven, [Ronald] was sitting in on
board meetings at his father’s company,”238 and while in college
(undergraduate at Wharton), he helped his father secure a few profitable
acquisitions. The deals “provided [Ronald] with his first taste of that unique
adrenaline rush on which entrepreneurs thrive . . . the victory was sweet—
and highly addicting. Ronald Perelman was hooked.”239 And he was
impatient. Having realized that his father “had no foreseeable desire to
retire,” Ronald Perelman decided to “jump[] ship”; he left the family
business in Pennsylvania and “without preparation and with characteristic
impatience and haste,” moved to New York, “arriv[ing] in Manhattan
without important connections or a game plan.”240
Perelman’s first acquisition, in May 1978, was the Cohen-Hatfield
jewelry chain, the majority of its business he promptly sold to Sam Walton,
chairman of Wal-Mart Stores, leaving the Cohen-Hatfield Industries with
their “most profitable operation, the wholesale jewelry.”241 His next move
was MacAndrews & Forbes, “a supplier of licorice extract and bulk
chocolate which had been started a century before.”242 He financed the
purchase with low grade, high yield bonds, “precursor of the legendary junk
bond” that will come to characterize his operations, consolidated under the
“banner of MacAndrews & Forbes Group.”243
In 1983, Perelman’s acquired Technicolor, “a prominent component of
the movie industry,”244 a transaction that would keep him in litigation for a

236. RICHARD HACK, WHEN MONEY IS KING: HOW REVLON’S RON PERELMAN MASTERED

THE WORLD OF FINANCE TO CREATE ONE OF AMERICA’S GREATEST BUSINESS EMPIRES, AND
FOUND GLAMOUR, BEAUTY AND THE HIGH LIFE IN THE BARGAIN 2 (1996); Jacob Bernstein,

The Debt King, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2022.
237. HACK, supra note 236, at 2.
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id. at 4–5.
240. Id. at 9.
241. Id. at 10 –12.
242. Id. at 13.
243. Id. at 13–17.
244. Id. at 20.
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decade longer,245 and in 1984, he took MacAndrews & Forbes private.246 A
few months later, MacAndrews & Forbes acquired Pantry Pride, “a
supermarket chain discharged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization in
1981.”247 Shortly thereafter, Eric Gleacher called Perelman.248 An
investment banker with Morgan Stanley, Gleacher suggested that Perelman
acquire Revlon, “the cosmetic colossus.”249 As Gleacher explained to
Perelman, Revlon “was a slumbering Titan”: “profits had fallen . . . the stock
had slid”;250 “turning the company around would be a challenge” for which
Perelman was well suited.251
Perelman was intrigued, and the Revlon saga began. On June 14, 1985,
Perelman visited Bergerac’s “lavish penthouse apartment.”252 At the time,
Revlon “had over $2.3 billion in assets and net worth in excess of $1
billion.”253 Perelman’s recently acquired Pantry Pride “had assets of $407
million . . . a net worth of about $145 million . . . and a huge tax-loss
carryforward of over $300 million,” and Perelman wanted to use it to
purchase Revlon.254 Bergerac, the “courtly, somewhat imperious, urbane,
witty Frenchman,” was unimpressed with “the crude, brusque, [and]
humorless” Perelman.255 “Can you imagine this guy, saying he’s going to
make me a rich man?” Bergerac angrily commented after the meeting.256
Indeed, despite Perelman’s successful background, the “Old Boys Club
of Wall Street” viewed him as an “upstart”: “a man whose pushy demeanor
and cigar smoke gave them more reason for irritation than for confidence.”257
That his banker was Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham with his junk bonds
operation did not help matters.258 As Perelman’s lawyer, Donald Drapkin,
commented, “They didn’t hit it off . . . Bergerac with his Chateau Lafite, and
245. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). See also Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, 2001 WL 515106 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2001) (noting that “the long history of the
dispute between these parties is well known not only to the parties, but also to all those who
are familiar with Delaware corporate law.”).
246. HACK, supra note 236, at 26.
247. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE
RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 193 (1988).
248. HACK, supra note 236, at 45.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; see also Revlon Is Called Overpriced by Some Analysts Despite Wide Speculation
About a Takeover, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1984.
252. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 193.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 194.
256. Id.
257. HACK, supra note 236, at 10.
258. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 197.
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Ronnie with his diet Coke.”259
The aftermath of the June 14th meeting is well documented in corporate
law casebooks. Perelman, frustrated that his attempts at a friendly
transaction were not reciprocated, made a hostile tender offer to Revlon’s
shareholders. Revlon responded by implementing a poison pill and a
defensive stock repurchase plan, involving an exchange of notes for shares
of Revlon’s stock. The notes included serious limitations on Revlon’s ability
to incur additional debt (these restrictions could be waived by a majority of
the independent directors on the Revlon board). When Perelman did not
back down and continued to bid on Revlon’s stock, the Revlon board
responded by negotiating a merger agreement with their chosen knight
(Forstmann Little & Co.); it included Revlon’s promise to remove the notes’
covenants. When angered noteholders threatened suit, Revlon solicited
Forstmann’s support for the notes’ par value and, in exchange, granted
Forstmann an option to purchase certain Revlon assets at “some $100-$175
million” below their value if “another acquirer got 40% of Revlon’s shares”
and a twenty five million dollar cancellation fee “if another acquiror got
more than 19.9% of Revlon’s stock.”260 Perelman “challeng[ed] the lock-up,
the cancellation fee . . . and the Notes covenants.”261
The financial and legal battle was, as Connie Bruck writes, “a class war,
between the corporate America and Wall Street elite, and the Drexel
arrivistes.”262 It reflected “the age-old hatred for the outsider, always
exacerbated when that undesirable other dares to venture beyond his confines
and encroach upon the elite’s preserve.”263 Unlike the second-generation
Americans we saw in Part II of this Article, who, seemingly united against
anti-Semitism, aimed to find their place in corporate America by
entrepreneurship or investment, Milken and Perelman were fighting against
lawyers who, by the 1980s, “were part of the Jewish establishment in New
York.”264 As Bruck writes, those within the establishment “feared that the
common strain among these nouveau entrepreneurs and their nouveau
bankers at Drexel—an overwhelming majority were Jews—would unleash a
backlash of virulent anti-Semitism.”265
Joseph Flom of Skadden Arps, Perelman’s lawyers, was accustomed to

259.
260.
1986).
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 194.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178–79 (Del.
Id. at 179; see also Cole, supra note 232.
BRUCK, supra note 247, at 197.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id.

2022]

SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

743

being scorned. Described as “indifferent to social niceties,” he was also well
respected; “in the judgment of colleagues and of some adversaries, his will
to win was unsurpassed and he was often masterful.”266 As noted in Part II
of this Article, in the 1940s, when white-shoe firms looked with disdain on
derivative litigation, Jewish lawyers took on the representation of minority
shareholders. In the 1950s and 1960s, when “old-line Wall Street law firms”
considered it “scandalous for one company to buy another company without
the target agreeing to be bought,”267 Flom built his practice and reputation
representing those engaged in proxy fights.268 When, in the 1980s, hostile
takeovers became, almost overnight, acceptable and what “every law firm
wanted to do,” Flom was ready. 269 It was Flom, the legal mastermind, who
ultimately ensured Perelman’s victory.
The Chancery Court of Delaware, apparently unfazed by the social and
cultural wars the case engendered, found for the plaintiffs and issued a
preliminary injunction. Citing Unocal, Justice Walsh (he was nominated to
the Supreme Court three weeks before the decision was announced), wrote
the Chancery Court decision, stating:
The board’s primary responsibility after the exchange offer was to
bargain for the rights of the remaining equity holders. By agreeing
to a lock-up and no shop clause in exchange for protecting the
rights of the Noteholders, the Revlon Board failed in its fiduciary
duty to the shareholders. The board may have been informed, but
its performance did not conform to the other component of the
business judgment rule—the duty of loyalty. The board’s selfinterest in resolving the Noteholders’ problems led to concessions
which effectively excluded Pantry Pride to the detriment of
Revlon’s shareholders. Thus, the element of loyalty may turn, as
it does here, in the selection of a takeover defense or a bargaining
device that is not proportionate to the objective needs of the
shareholders but merely serves the convenience of the directors.270
266. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 126–27 (2008).
267. Id. at 124–25. As Gladwell notes,
up until the 1980s old-line Wall Street law firms had a very specific idea about
what it was that they did. They were corporate lawyers. They represented the
country’s largest and most prestigious companies, and ‘represented’ meant they
handled the taxes and legal work behind the issuing of stocks and bonds and made
sure their clients did not run afoul of federal regulators.
Id. at 124.
268. Id. at 125–26.
269. Id. at 127–28.
270. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch.
1985).
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While Walsh cited Unocal for his statement, his analysis focused on the
traditional directors’ duty of loyalty, and Flom was the first to notice. As he
told Stuart Shapiro, who would argue the case before the Supreme Court of
Delaware, “You can’t argue that they have an absolute right or absolute
obligation to take a certain action. You have to argue that what they did was
conflicted and wrong. Not because they chose one course over the other, but
because they did it on the wrong basis.”271
As Flom understood, if Shapiro could demonstrate that the directors,
when choosing Forstmann, did so to ensure that Revlon’s noteholders were
protected, he would demonstrate that the directors breached their duty of
loyalty to their shareholders and Perelman would win the case. And Flom
was right. Justice Moore for the Delaware Supreme Court began by noting:
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition
that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit. . . . The directors’ role changed from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.272
Because this passage has since been quoted to champion corporate
law’s commitment to shareholder value, it is worth emphasizing that
Moore’s was not a statement about corporate purpose. Rather, Moore, who
defined fairness in Weinberger and applied it in Unocal, applied it again in
Revlon. Revlon’s directors, according to Unocal, were required to assess the
threat of Perelman’s bid and respond, bearing in mind the two prongs of the
fairness standard: fair dealing and fair price. When the directors allowed
their concerns about the noteholders to cloud their judgment, they failed to
meet this standard, and thus breached their duty of loyalty. As Moore
explained:
The impending waiver of the Notes covenants had caused the
value of the Notes to fall, and the board was aware of the
noteholders’ ire as well as their subsequent threats of suit. The
directors thus made support of the Notes an integral part of the
company’s dealings with Forstmann, even though their primary
responsibility at this stage was to the equity owners . . . The
principal benefit went to the directors, who avoided personal
271. JOHN WEIR CLOSE, A GIANT COW-TIPPING BY SAVAGES: THE BOOM, BUST, AND BOOM
CULTURE OF M&A 109 (2013).
272. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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liability to a class of creditors to whom the board owed no further
duty under the circumstances. Thus, when a board ends an intense
bidding contest on an insubstantial basis, and where a significant
by-product of that action is to protect the directors against a
perceived threat of personal liability for consequences stemming
from the adoption of previous defensive measures, the action
cannot withstand the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal requires of
director conduct. 273
What has since become known as the Revlon duty, that is, the duty of
directors to maximize profit to their shareholders, was nothing more than an
application of the 1980s fairness standard of review.274
Notably, the beneficiaries of the decision in Revlon were those who
traded their shares as the struggle was brewing. “In the last five trading days
before the Pantry Pride offer, an average of 1,258,800 shares of Revlon
common stock per day traded hands, as compared to 283,760 per day in the
preceding five trading days.”275 An entire “shareholder base” had changed
before the transaction even happened.276 “Here we built a great American
corporation,” Mr. Bergerac noted.277 “Then through this process the stock
ended up in the hands of the arbitrageurs, who forced the sale of the
company.”278 “In a larger sense,” Karen Ho writes, “the takeover movement
of the 1980s helped to radically re-shift the interests of senior executives
from the workings and constituents of the corporation . . . to those of Wall
Street and large shareholders.”279
In short, a profit-maximization ideal that originated in the Progressives’
concerns about minority shareholders and was shaped in the reform-oriented
New York courts in the midcentury, became in Delaware’s capable hands a
means of promoting the dominance of financiers and their lawyers.

273. Id. at 182, 184.
274. See similarly Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary
Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?),
49 BUS. L. 1593–94 (1994) (arguing that, in the 1980s, the Delaware courts have turned
“Delaware fiduciary law toward a single, more unified standard, and away from doctrinal
fragmentation”). As Cunningham and Yablon note, Justice Moore had grimaced when an
attorney used the term “Revlon-land” during oral argument in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). Id. at 1593.
275. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 215–16.
276. Id.
277. Michel C. Bergerac, Who Made Over Revlon, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2016.
278. Id.
279. HO, supra note 7, at 141.
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EPILOGUE
“The conquest of Revlon,” Bruck writes, “signaled the end of an era.”280
Revlon and its advisers believed they were defending “a way of corporate
life—plush, congenial and secure.”281 And they lost to the “junk-bond
marauders.”282 A company, connections, relationships were broken.283
Financially, however, everyone fared well. The lawyers and investment
bankers netted high fees;284 Revlon’s senior executives lost their jobs but
cashed on their golden parachutes (golden parachutes totaling $27.2 million
were paid out to twelve executives);285 Bergerac’s severance package
amounted to $35 million;286 while Perelman got Revlon, and the social status
that was presumably associated with it. The shareholders received $58 per
share and even those who exchanged shares for bonds made profit.287
And here perhaps is the peculiarity of the shareholder wealth
maximization idea that many have since associated with Revlon. While the
litigation was brought against the directors of Revlon, at stake was not the
welfare of the corporation (in fact, during the hostile takeover decade, the
welfare of the corporation was often at odds with the well-being, or profits,
of its constituencies). The question of fiduciary obligations and the
associated fairness standard and fair price, more broadly, became focused
not on the relationship between directors and shareholders, but rather on the
allocation of benefits, or balance of interests, between shareholders and other
corporate constituencies, in the case of Revlon, the noteholders.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, a case addressing defensive
tactics that blocked Time’s shareholders from accepting Paramount’s tender
offer at almost twice the market price of Time’s stock, illustrates the courts’
shift in focus.288 Describing Time as a case involving differences of opinion
280. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 227.
281. Id. at 277.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 229.
284. See, e.g., JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE DECLINE
OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 216 (2011) (noting that “[t]he Revlon deal produced
stunning fees for the bankers and lawyers”); Daniel Hertzberg, Advice in Revlon Brawl Wasn’t
Cheap: Fees in Takeover Fight Will Establish Record, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1985 at 1 (noting
that “[i]nvestment bankers and lawyers were likely to rake in $100 million or more in fees”).
285. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 231–32.
286. Id.; CLOSE, supra note 271, at 112.
287. BRUCK, supra note 247, at 232–33. As Bruck writes, “the only dissonant note in this
chorus of happy profiteers came, as is usual in these transactions, from the bondholders of the
acquired company who found their paper suddenly downgraded now that the company was
so debt-laden.” Id. at 233.
288. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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between the directors’ vision for the corporation and the shareholders’ wish
to maximize their profits, the Chancery Court of Delaware saw no need to
apply the fairness standard or restrict the directors’ actions, irrespective of
these actions’ impact on the shareholders’ wealth (and the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed).289 As Chancellor Allen explained, “[D]irectors,
not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm . . . That
many, presumably most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise
than it has done does not . . . afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation
of the board’s business judgment.”290
More recent decisions further limited Revlon’s impact on directors’
duties toward their corporations’ shareholders, reverting to the courts’
embrace of managerial freedom. In Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, a case
involving a class action challenge to a merger transaction, the Supreme Court
of Delaware concluded that “there are no legally prescribed steps that
directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties. Thus, the directors’
failure to take any specific steps during the sale process could not have
demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.”291 “[T]here is a vast
difference between an inadequate or flawed effort to carry out fiduciary
duties and a conscious disregard for those duties,” the Court noted.292 And
in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, the Delaware Supreme Court
went further, holding that when a stock-for-stock merger “is approved by a
fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, the business
judgment rule applies.”293
In turn, decisions having to do with the allocation of benefits between
different investors, continued to refer to the shareholder wealth
maximization. For one thing, the same year Revlon was decided, in Katz v.
Oak Industries, Inc., Chancellor Allen noted that “[i]t is the obligation of
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation’s stockholders.”294 If they do so “at the expense of others,” here
the debt holders, it “does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”295
Two years later, in Simons v. Cogan, the Supreme Court of Delaware
similarly declined to extend the fiduciary obligations of corporate
289. See Id. at 1152 (“We find ample evidence in the record to support the Chancellor’s
Conclusion that the Time board’s decision . . . was entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule.”).
290. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at 89–90
(Del. Ch. 1989).
291. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009).
292. Id.
293. Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 25 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015).
294. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. 1986).
295. Id.
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management to holders of convertible debentures. Justice Walsh reasoned:
“A debenture is a credit instrument which does not devolve upon its holder
an equity interest in the issuing corporation.”296 A convertible debenture was
not different, representing “a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a
debt and . . . not . . . an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary
for the imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary
duties.”297 To trigger a fiduciary duty, Walsh concluded, “an existing
property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist.”298
And in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, which addressed potential
conflicting interests between the common and preferred stock during a
merger, Vice Chancellor Laster stressed that directors are required to “strive
in good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate beneficiaries
of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its contractual claimants.”299
The apparent dissonance between Revlon’s impact on directors’ duties
to shareholders and Delaware’s statements about shareholder wealth
maximization in cases involving other constituencies is resolved when we
recognize Revlon and its aftermath as the culmination of the history told in
this Article. As we saw, the rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization has
consistently been used to assuage shareholders’ concerns while courts
empowered directors to act as “Platonic Guardians.”300 Just as courts earlier
in the twentieth century pointed to shareholder profit maximization to
encourage investment and assure investors that they would continue to
receive income from their corporations, the Delaware courts’ refusal to
extend fiduciary obligations to holders of debt securities, convertible debt,
and preferred stock reassured shareholders that corporations were run for
their benefit. At the same time, the cases chipping away at Revlon’s reach
guaranteed managers their freedom.
Moreover, the rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization has offered
corporate managers a tool with which to thwart challenges to their power
(including the threat of hostile takeovers). Like courts throughout the
twentieth century, the Delaware courts in the 1980s provided directors
language with which they could justify their actions; so long as corporate

296. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 304.
299. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013).
300. For the description of the board of directors as Platonic Guardians, see Robert A.
Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 697 (1960); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577 (2002-2003).
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directors explained their decisions as maximizing wealth for their
shareholders, the Delaware courts were not likely to intervene or evaluate
their actions. Shareholder wealth maximization has been and will remain
dicta, a rhetoric, not an edict.

